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RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS: HOSANNA-TABOR 
AND THE INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF 
RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT

 
ABSTRACT 
In its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
and School v. EEOC, the Supreme Court held that the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment require recognition of a “ministerial exception” to 
general antidiscrimination statutes (in that case, the ADA), because 
religious institutions must have autonomy in selecting their ministers. In 
the course of its analysis, however, the Court made a very interesting 
move. In response to the government’s argument that the case could be 
resolved under the general First Amendment right of association, the 
Court responded that this position was “untenable,” and indeed 
“remarkable,” because the very existence of the Religion Clauses 
indicated that religious groups must be treated differently from secular 
groups. It also rejected the view that its groundbreaking decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith, which interpreted the Free Exercise 
Clause extremely narrowly, precluded reliance on the Religion Clauses 
here, curtly distinguishing Smith on the grounds that it did not involve 
“government interference with an internal church decision that affects the 
faith and mission of the church itself.” Hosanna-Tabor thus appears to 
stand for the propositions that religious groups are different from secular 
groups for constitutional purposes and entitled to extra constitutional 
protections, and further, that religious institutions such as churches 
possess broader Free Exercise rights than do individuals. In this Article, I 
argue that both these propositions are indefensible in light of the text, 
history, and purposes of the Religion Clauses. I further argue that 
granting religious institutions special constitutional rights raises some 
very difficult, ultimately irresolvable boundary problems regarding the 
scope of the ministerial exception.  
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Ultimately, I conclude that a much better analytic course for the Court 
to have followed in Hosanna-Tabor would have been to rely on the 
freedoms of assembly and association protected by the First Amendment, 
which the Court so casually rejected. The effect of relying on assembly 
and association would be to grant all groups whose activities are relevant 
to democratic politics a right of autonomy, including a right to select its 
members and leaders. Religious groups would certainly qualify for such a 
right (thus affirming the result in Hosanna-Tabor), but so would many 
secular groups on the same terms. I discuss the ways in which this vision 
of associational rights fits well with the overall structure of the First 
Amendment, and with the instrumental role that religious groups (as 
opposed to individuals) play in our society. Relying on assembly and 
association also avoids the boundary problems raised by the ministerial 
exception and defuses the tension with free-speech doctrine created by the 
Court’s preferential treatment of religious groups in Hosanna-Tabor. I 
conclude by exploring the ways in which the existence of the Religion 
Clauses may be relevant to religious groups’ assembly and associational 
rights, even if they are not the source of those rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Supreme Court issued its most important decision in many 
years on the subject of the rights of religious groups: Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“Hosanna-Tabor”).1 Unfortunately, Hosanna-
Tabor’s importance is matched only by its opaqueness. The specific 
holding of Hosanna-Tabor is that the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment
2
 require recognition of a “ministerial exception” to 
antidiscrimination statutes—specifically, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”). This decision means religious institutions may not be sued 
under antidiscrimination statutes regarding employment disputes with 
ministers.  
This result must be correct. After all, it is unthinkable that the Catholic 
Church could be legally required to hire women as priests. But why it is 
correct, as a doctrinal matter, is a rather more difficult question. In 
particular, it is difficult to reconcile the reasoning of Hosanna-Tabor with 
key modern Religion Clause precedents. It is the contention of this Article 
that such reconciliation is simply not possible. The acclamation with 
which Hosanna-Tabor has been received by constitutional scholars
3
 is 
justified by neither text, nor history, nor theory. This is not to say that the 
result in Hosanna-Tabor is wrong, but its reasoning surely is incorrect. 
If the Religion Clauses cannot justify an exemption for churches from 
antidiscrimination statutes, then how can the result in Hosanna-Tabor be 
correct? It is my contention that the freedom of assembly, along with the 
nontextual but closely related right of association protected by the latter 
portion of the First Amendment, provides a more than adequate basis for 
such an exemption. In Hosanna-Tabor the Solicitor General in fact argued 
that the right of association provided the strongest grounds for a 
ministerial exemption (albeit, he argued against application of the 
 
 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (henceforth “Hosanna-Tabor”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 3. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, 
Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013); Michael W. McConnell, 
Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012); but see Caroline Mala 
Corbin, Colloquy Essay, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 
(2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 
917 (2013). 
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exemption in that case).
4
 The argument was, however, off-handedly 
rejected by the Court as “untenable” and “remarkable.”5 My goal is to 
demonstrate why relying on assembly and association to protect religious 
groups is not only not “untenable,” it is in fact entirely logical given the 
history, structure, and purposes of the First Amendment.
6
 Such an 
approach avoids the doctrinal conundrums elided by the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court as well as many of the very difficult boundary problems raised by 
the Court’s reliance on the Religion Clauses. It also fits well with the 
underlying purposes of the Assembly Clause and right of association. In 
particular, I demonstrate that the purposes of the Religion Clauses, 
including especially the right to free exercise of religion, are rooted in 
concerns about individual dignity and freedom of conscience. By contrast, 
the rest of the First Amendment is best understood in far more 
instrumental terms, as designed to protect and strengthen the democratic 
structure of the Constitution. It is this fact that makes the latter portion of 
the Amendment a far more conducive place to find protection for groups, 
including religious groups, than the Religion Clauses. 
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the Hosanna-Tabor decision, 
placing it in the context of the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence and 
recent scholarship regarding the “Freedom of the Church.” Part II 
discusses why the Religion Clauses provide a poor home for the group 
right established by Hosanna-Tabor. Part III demonstrates that the 
freedom of assembly and right of association protected by the latter part of 
the First Amendment are, for textual, historical, and structural reasons, the 
logical sources of group rights. Finally, Part IV circles back to the 
Religion Clauses and suggests how the Establishment Clause in particular 
might be relevant to the analysis of the rights of religious groups, even if it 
is not the source of those rights.  
 
 
 4. Brief for Respondent at 31–32, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. 
E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (No. 10-553), 2011 WL 3319555. 
 5. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
 6. Others have also defended rooting the ministerial exemption in association and/or assembly 
grounds. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of 
Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391 (1987); Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free 
Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71 (2001); Scott M. Noveck, The Promise and Problems of 
Treating Religious Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 745 (2009); Schragger & 
Schwartzman, supra note 3, at 976–77; McConnell, supra note 3, at 825–26; John D. Inazu, The 
Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335, 360 
n.133 (2013). My arguments here, however, differ substantially from earlier arguments in that they 
rely explicitly on fundamental differences in the structure and purposes behind the Religion Clauses on 
the one hand, and the rights of assembly/association on the other. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/6
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I. HOSANNA-TABOR AND THE “FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH” 
The Hosanna-Tabor litigation arose out of an employment dispute 
between the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School and 
Cheryl Perich, a “called” teacher at the school. A “called” teacher is one 
who is “regarded as having been called to [her] vocation by God through a 
congregation.”7 Perich received special training to become a “called” 
teacher and her duties included teaching both secular and religious 
subjects, as well as attending and sometimes leading chapel service.
8
 The 
dispute between Perich and Hosanna-Tabor arose after Perich became sick 
and went on disability leave. Ultimately, Perich was refused permission to 
return to work. She then consulted an attorney and was fired.
9
 The Church 
claimed that the firing was because Perich’s “threat to sue the Church 
violated the Synod’s belief that Christians should resolve their disputes 
internally.”10 Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which filed a lawsuit on her behalf, 
in which Perich intervened.
11
 The lawsuit alleged that Perich was fired in 
retaliation for threatening to file a lawsuit under the ADA, which in turn 
violated the ADA.
12
 Hosanna-Tabor defended itself on the grounds that 
lower courts had read the First Amendment to create a “ministerial 
exception” to antidiscrimination laws, prohibiting courts from intervening 
in employment disputes between churches and their ministers.
13
 The 
district court granted Hosanna-Tabor summary judgment, but the court of 
appeals reversed, holding that although the ministerial exception existed, 
Perich did not qualify for it.
14
 
The Supreme Court reversed and ruled in favor of Hosanna-Tabor in a 
unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts. The Court began by 
reviewing some religious history and concluded that the Religion Clauses, 
in combination, required that the federal government “would have no role 
in filling ecclesiastical offices.”15 Based on this principle, the Court 
recognized the ministerial exception for the first time. The Court explained 
 
 
 7. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699. 
 8. Id. at 699–700. 
 9. Id. at 700. 
 10. Id. at 701. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 703. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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why the application of antidiscrimination law to a dispute between a 
church and minister violated the Religion Clauses in these terms:  
By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its 
own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state 
the power to determine which individuals will minister to the 
faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.
16
  
The Court acknowledged Perich and the EEOC’s argument that any right 
of religious groups to immunity from discrimination laws could be based 
on the “constitutional right to freedom of association—a right ‘implicit’ in 
the First Amendment,” but found this position “untenable.”17 Importantly, 
the Court reasoned that the implication of relying on freedom of 
association meant “the First Amendment analysis should be the same, 
whether the association in question is the Lutheran Church, a labor union, 
or a social club.”18 But the Court found this implication “hard to square 
with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude 
to the rights of religious organizations,”19 and could not “accept the 
remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a 
religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.”20 Leaving 
aside the doubtful premise that freedom of association cannot distinguish 
between a church and a “social club,” the Court’s rejection of association 
clearly rested on what the Court considered the self-evident proposition 
that religious groups were entitled to greater constitutional protections 
than secular groups.  
The Court concluded its analysis by holding that Perich qualified as a 
“minister” for the purposes of the exception. The majority provided little 
clear guidance on this point and explicitly declined “to adopt a rigid 
formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,”21 finding 
that “the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her 
employment.”22 
Though the Court’s opinion was unanimous, the majority’s failure to 
adopt a clear definition of the term “minister” elicited two concurring 
 
 
 16. Id. at 706. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 707. 
 22. Id. 
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opinions. Justice Thomas argued that to ensure religious autonomy, 
secular courts should not seek to define who is or is not a minister. 
Instead, courts should accept a church’s own good faith belief that an 
individual was a minister.
23
 Justice Alito also concurred, joined by Justice 
Kagan. In contrast to Justice Thomas, he argued that the courts could and 
should adopt a usable definition of the term minister, based on “the 
function performed” by the individuals rather than on the use of the term 
“minister” or formal ordination, in order to ensure that diverse religious 
groups could invoke the exception.
24
 In particular, he argued that the 
exception “should apply to any ‘employee’ who leads a religious 
organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies 
or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.”25 In defending 
this definition, Justice Alito directly invoked the Court’s precedents 
recognizing a right of “expressive association,”26 arguing that the 
important expressive role of religious groups justified both the ministerial 
exception and the definition that he was proposing.
27
 These are the same 
precedents that the majority opinion flatly rejected as a basis for the 
Court’s decision. 
To understand the byplay among the Solicitor General’s brief for the 
EEOC, the majority opinion, and Justice Alito’s concurrence regarding the 
freedom of association, some background is needed. The Supreme Court 
has long recognized a constitutional right of group autonomy, a right that 
it has variously rooted in the Assembly Clause of the First Amendment 
and in a right of “association” also protected by the First Amendment. 
Indeed, for many decades the Court used the terms assembly and 
association interchangeably.
28
 Furthermore, many modern scholars have 
pointed out that the Court’s protection of such rights makes perfect sense 
given the central role that groups of citizens have played in the democratic 
system of government established by the Constitution.
29
 This significance 
 
 
 23. Id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 24. Id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 26. Id. at 712–13 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 
(1984); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000)). 
 27. Id.  
 28. For a fuller exposition of the development and scope of the rights of assembly/association, 
see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 983–85 (2011); JOHN D. INAZU, 
LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 49–62 (2012). 
 29. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 
555–61 (2009); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 575–88 
(2010); Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 642–44, 700–01, 730–34 
(2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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was fully recognized by the Framers,
30
 and was famously expounded early 
in our history by de Tocqueville.
31
 Moreover, Supreme Court cases from 
the first and second Red Scare eras make it clear that the rights of 
assembly and association protect not only temporary gatherings of 
citizens, but also permanent groups.
32
 
The Court’s approach changed with its seminal decision in 1958 in 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.
33
 In this and subsequent cases the 
Court largely abandoned references to the Assembly Clause in defining 
group rights and narrowed its understanding of the association right to one 
of “expressive association,” meaning a right to form groups for the 
purposes of speaking. The implications of this move were two-fold: first, 
group autonomy was no longer a textual right grounded in the Assembly 
Clause, but rather a non-textual “implicit” right; and second, group 
autonomy was no longer an independent right, but rather one derivative of 
free speech. This process culminated with the Court’s 1984 decision in 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
34
 in which the Court rejected the Jaycees’ claimed 
First Amendment right to limit its membership to young men on the 
grounds that the Jaycees were not sufficiently expressive to obtain 
constitutional protection.
35
 Since the Jaycees decision, associational rights 
have been much more difficult to invoke. It is true that the Boy Scouts did 
successfully invoke the association right to exclude a gay scoutmaster in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
36
 suggesting that association rights may be 
having a resurgence. In subsequent cases, however, the Court has 
subsumed association claims into free speech analysis and generally 
dismissed them handily.
37
 
This doctrinal history sheds important light on the role of association in 
Hosanna-Tabor. As John Inazu has argued, one powerful reason why the 
majority in that case was reluctant to rely on freedom of association or 
assembly to protect religious group rights is that the Court has essentially 
 
 
 30. Inazu, supra note 29, at 571–77. 
 31. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189–95, 513 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1840). 
 32. See Bhagwat, supra note 28, at 983–84 (discussing opinions in Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927)); id. at 985 (discussing American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 
(1950)). 
 33. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 34. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 35. Id. at 626–27. 
 36. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). These developments are described in more detail in Bhagwat, supra 
note 28, at 985–89; INAZU, supra note 28, at 63–149. 
 37. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730 (2010); Christian Legal 
Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2975, 2985 (2010). 
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forgotten that the freedom of assembly exists and has narrowed 
association to the point of ineffectiveness.
38
 It is telling that the Solicitor 
General’s brief explicitly relied on the limitations of the modern right of 
association to argue that Hosanna-Tabor’s First Amendment defense 
should be rejected.
39
 By contrast, Justice Alito invoked a much more 
vigorous vision of association in his concurrence, albeit without clearly 
distinguishing between the Religion Clauses and freedom of association.  
Given the state of modern jurisprudence, the majority’s concerns make 
sense. However, if one recognizes a robust right of group autonomy rooted 
in the Assembly Clause (or a robust nontextual right of association for that 
matter), a right which is not derivative from free speech but is rather, in 
the Court’s early words, “cognate to those of free speech and free press 
and . . . equally fundamental,”40 then those concerns appear misplaced. As 
this brief discussion demonstrates, such a right of assembly/association is 
far better supported by history, text, and doctrine than is the modern, 
truncated right of expressive association. And as I will discuss in greater 
detail below,
41
 such a right fully supports the result in Hosanna-Tabor 
without raising the intractable difficulties of the Court’s approach. 
Reactions to Hosanna-Tabor among leading Religion Clause scholars 
have been largely positive. Hosanna-Tabor’s timing fit well with what 
Paul Horwitz has described as the “the institutional turn” in First 
Amendment law.
42
 Horwitz himself praises the decision as consistent with 
the institutional turn because it emphasizes the autonomy of religious 
institutions to a greater degree than individuals. Horowitz calls for the 
expansion of the case’s holding to all church employees.43 Similarly, Rick 
Garnett has argued vigorously for protection of “the Freedom of the 
Church,” a very strong form of autonomy for religious institutions, and 
reads Hosanna-Tabor to support such a view.
44
 Michael McConnell is 
largely in agreement,
45
 as is Alan Brownstein, though with more caveats.
46
 
The primary dissenting voices have been those of Richard Schragger and 
 
 
 38. John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 787 
(2014). 
 39. Brief for Respondent, supra note 4, at 30–31. 
 40. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 
530 (1945). 
 41. See infra Part III. 
 42. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 8 (2013). 
 43. Id. at 187–89.  
 44. Garnett, supra note 3, at 34–35. 
 45. McConnell, supra note 3, at 836. 
 46. Alan Brownstein, Protecting the Religious Liberty of Religious Institutions, 21 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 201, 206 (2013). 
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Micah Schwartzman. In their excellent article critiquing the “institutional 
autonomy” reading of Hosanna-Tabor, they argue that granting special 
protection to religious institutions is inconsistent with the modern 
understanding of religious freedom as rooted in a broader freedom of 
conscience.
47
  
This Article seeks to refute the institutional understanding of the 
Religion Clauses adopted by most scholars. Further, it complements 
Schragger and Schartzman’s arguments by demonstrating how differences 
between the Religion Clauses and the rest of the First Amendment explain 
not only why the Religion Clauses do not support a broad right of group 
autonomy, but more importantly, why the rights of assembly and 
association do. 
II. THE PROBLEMATICS OF GROUP RIGHTS UNDER THE RELIGION 
CLAUSES 
In this Part, I demonstrate why that the Court’s efforts to locate group 
rights for religious institutions in the Religion Clauses ultimately must fail. 
Contrary to the Court’s conclusory arguments, such group rights are 
supported neither by the text of the Religion Clauses, nor the Court’s own 
doctrine, nor historical understandings from the Framing period, nor the 
purposes of the Religion Clauses. Furthermore, the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court’s reliance on the Religion Clauses for its holding raises a host of 
boundary concerns which are unresolvable and entirely unnecessary. 
A. Text and Doctrine 
The ruling of Hosanna-Tabor that the rights of religious institutions 
derive from the Religion Clauses, and not the rights of assembly and 
association, seems at first glance perfectly logical. In fact, the Court’s 
comment that this must be so because “the text of the First Amendment 
. . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”48 
seems irrefutable. Indeed, given this seemingly obvious point one might 
wonder why the Solicitor General’s Office—hardly an organization prone 
 
 
 47. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 3, at 5, 45–48. Other important critics include 
Caroline Corbin and Leslie Griffin. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality 
of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1988–89 
(2007); Corbin, supra note 3, at 969–70; Griffin, supra note 3, at 996–99. 
 48. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012). 
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to silliness—took the position that the association right was the sole source 
of autonomy rights for religious groups. 
The reason, quite simply, is that Chief Justice Roberts’s flat assertion 
hides a multitude of sins. As Christopher Lund points out, Roberts’s 
description of the text of the First Amendment is simply wrong: the 
Religion Clauses protect religion, not religious groups.
49
 There is no 
textual or historical evidence that the Framers meant either the 
Establishment or Free Exercise Clause to protect groups as such. At most, 
groups received protection if necessary to protect individual members of 
religious groups. 
More fundamentally, the Court’s own doctrine before Hosanna-Tabor 
tended to undermine claims under the Religion Clauses. The key precedent 
here, relied upon heavily by the Solicitor General,
50
 is the Court’s decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith,
51
 which held that the “right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law 
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).’”52 The Solicitor General argued that this case fell squarely 
within Smith, since no one disputed that the ADA was a “valid and neutral 
law of general applicability.” The Hosanna-Tabor Court conceded the 
latter point but nonetheless curtly distinguished Smith on the grounds that 
“Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The 
present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an 
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church 
itself.”53 In other words, the Court limited Smith to the external acts of 
individuals, holding that an “internal church decision” does receive 
protection, even against generally applicable laws. 
This distinction has been heavily criticized, and rightly so.
54
 After all, 
even if the Free Exercise Clause was intended to provide some protection 
to religious institutions, it is clear that the primary focus of the Clause is 
on individual conscience. Note in this regard that James Madison’s 
original proposal to Congress, which eventually led to the Free Exercise 
Clause, stated that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account 
of religious belief or worship . . . nor shall the full and equal rights of 
 
 
 49. Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 
108 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
 50. Brief for Respondents, supra note 4, at 20–29. 
 51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 52. Id. at 879 (citation omitted). 
 53. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 54. See Lund, supra note 49, at 11 & n.53. 
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conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”55 In addition, 
George Mason’s proposal, on which Madison’s was based, read:  
 That Religion or the Duty which we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by Reason and 
Conviction, not by Force or violence, and therefore all men have an 
equal, natural, and unalienable Right to the free Exercise of 
Religion according to the Dictates of Conscience.
56
  
There can be no serious doubt that both of these formulations focus on the 
freedom of conscience of individuals, not the autonomy of groups. 
Further, there is no evidence in the drafting history that the changes to the 
language of the Free Exercise Clause were meant to alter this basic 
emphasis. The Court’s conclusion that the Clause gives greater protection 
to groups than individuals thus has no basis in text or history, and indeed 
seems to have it exactly backwards. Finally, the Court’s distinction 
between “external” and “internal” acts does not save the day. This 
distinction rests on preferring institutions to individuals, since individuals 
cannot act internally. The Free Exercise Clause is thus a very weak 
grounding for the sorts of group rights recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, at 
least as long as Smith remains the law. 
But what about the Establishment Clause, which the Court also relied 
upon? On its face, the Establishment Clause seems an even weaker basis 
for the result in Hosanna-Tabor than the Free Exercise Clause. The 
“ministerial exception” is a defense against regulation. To say that the 
Establishment Clause requires the exemption is to say that regulation of a 
religious institution violates the Establishment Clause. That is very odd. 
Interference with religious practice naturally raises Free Exercise 
concerns, but it is unclear how such regulation establishes a religion. The 
Court’s explanation was that when the government appoints a religious 
minister, it constitutes establishment. As the Solicitor General pointed out, 
however, actual appointment of a minister was not at issue in Hosanna-
Tabor, since neither Perich nor the EEOC were seeking reinstatement as a 
remedy.
57
 The Court’s response was that the remedies Perich sought—
mainly back- and front-pay—“would operate as a penalty on the Church 
 
 
 55. AMENDMENTS OFFERED IN CONGRESS BY JAMES MADISON JUNE 8, 1789, available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bor/amd_jmad.htm (last visited June 2, 2014). 
 56. GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, ¶ 20, available at http://www. 
constitution.org/gmason/amd_gmas.htm (last visited June 2, 2014). 
 57. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709; Brief for Respondents, supra note 4, at 33. No one sought 
reinstatement because apparently the school had closed by the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court. Id. at 12.  
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for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by 
the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination.”58 This 
conclusory assertion might explain why the Free Exercise Clause is 
violated by such remedies—though Smith suggests it is not. It does not, 
however, seem to have any link to the Establishment Clause. 
In short, the Court’s Religion Clause analysis in Hosanna-Tabor, 
including its attempts to reconcile the holding with binding precedent, is 
exceedingly unpersuasive. Why then did the Court walk this path? The 
Court itself gave a clear answer: because in light of the existence of the 
Religion Clauses, it found “untenable” and “remarkable” the proposition 
that religious groups receive no more constitutional protection than “a 
labor union or a social club.”59 In other words, the Court was required to 
rely on the Religion Clauses because it believed that the Constitution 
favors religious groups over nonreligious ones. The result in Hosanna-
Tabor does create such preferred protection for religious groups. Under 
the ministerial exception, churches enjoy an absolute immunity from suits 
by ministers under antidiscrimination laws, eliminating even a minister’s 
ability to claim that the religious reasons given for firing her were 
pretextual.
60
 In contrast, the Court’s modern expressive association 
jurisprudence grants immunity from antidiscrimination laws to a secular 
group only if it can demonstrate that application of the law will interfere 
with the group’s ability to convey its message61—a difficult hurdle as 
cases such as Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees demonstrate.
62
 
The Hosanna-Tabor Court’s preference for religious groups is deeply 
troublesome. Most basically, this preference is entirely inconsistent with 
another key element of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence: the 
Court’s repeated statements that religion should be treated as a 
“viewpoint” for free speech purposes.63 If this is so, a preference for 
 
 
 58. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709. 
 59. Id. at 706.  
 60. Id. at 709. The scope of the immunity with respect to other sorts of claims, such as 
government enforcement of immigration and child labor laws, or contractual disputes between a 
church and minister, remain unresolved. Id. at 710. 
 61. See Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
627 (1984). 
 62. Id. at 626–28. 
 63. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3009 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting); 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102, 107 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–31 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–95 (1993). Alan Brownstein and Vikram Amar have forcefully criticized 
the equation of religion with a viewpoint. See Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing 
Associational Freedom Claims in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between 
Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505, 537–39 
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religious over secular groups would itself appear to be a form of viewpoint 
discrimination, violating basic free speech principles. This is because 
unlike the broader rights of association and assembly, a special right for 
religious groups is defined based on the substantive beliefs and goals of 
the protected group. This sort of ideological preferentialism is in serious 
tension with the Tocquevillian idea that private associations play a critical 
role in implementing American democracy.
64
 It seems highly unlikely that 
there is such a sharp conflict between foundational Religion Clause and 
foundational Free Speech principles. 
The preference also runs contrary to the wisdom in the lower courts. In 
a series of decisions prior to Hosanna-Tabor, those courts held, largely 
because of Smith, that even when a law impinges on the internal 
organization of a religious group, freedom of association provides greater 
protection to such groups than do the Religion Clauses.
65
 In Salvation 
Army v. Department of Community Affairs of the State of N.J.,
66
 the Third 
Circuit was faced with the question of whether an Adult Rehabilitation 
Center run by the Salvation Army was required to comply with New 
Jersey rules regulating boarding homes. The case had been litigated 
primarily on Free Exercise grounds, but while the case was pending on 
appeal the Supreme Court decided Smith. In response the Third Circuit 
rejected The Salvation Army’s Free Exercise claim,67 but nevertheless 
remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the Salvation 
Army’s expressive-association claims, which it found still viable.68  
Similarly, in Wiley Mission v. New Jersey,
69
 a church that ran a 
retirement center challenged a New Jersey regulation that required the 
governing boards of such centers to include a resident. The church claimed 
that the regulation would have, in effect, required the church to admit a 
non-member to its governing board. The court rejected Wiley Mission’s 
 
 
(2011); see also Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech 
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 164–72 (2002). My point is simply that so long 
as the Court continues to adhere to this approach, there is a deep tension between Hosanna-Tabor’s 
interpretation of the Religion Clauses and the Court’s free-speech jurisprudence. 
 64. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 31, at 189–95. 
 65. For a pre-Hosanna-Tabor scholarly identification of this point, see Noveck, supra note 6, at 
758. For a contrary example, see Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Educ. Of New York, 876 F. 
Supp. 2d 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 750 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2014) (enjoining on Free Exercise 
grounds a rule prohibiting use of school facilities for religious worship services, on remand from an 
appellate ruling rejecting a free-speech challenge to the same rule). 
 66. 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 67. Id. at 194–96. 
 68. Id. at 200–01. 
 69. No. 10-3024, 2011 WL 3841437 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2011). 
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Free Exercise claim, citing Smith.
70
 The court then granted Wiley Mission 
summary judgment on its freedom-of-expressive-association claim, 
concluding that, as in Boy Scouts v. Dale, forcing Wiley Mission to 
include a non-member on its governing board would significantly impair 
its ability to speak.
71
 Interestingly, the court considered an argument based 
on the ministerial exception in a footnote. While it did not have to resolve 
the issue, it strongly suggested that Smith barred such a claim.
72
 
In short, the Supreme Court’s premise that the Religion Clauses dictate 
a preference for religious groups over secular ones is simply wrong. The 
Free Exercise Clause may well establish special protections for the 
religious practices and conduct of individuals pursuant to their conscience, 
including perhaps the right of individuals to form religious groups, but it 
says nothing about religious groups as institutions.
73
 Similarly, the 
Establishment Clause clearly bars certain forms of governmental support 
to religious groups but not their secular equivalent.
74
 However, it says 
nothing about special rights for religious groups.  
B. History 
The history of the Religion Clauses is as problematic as the text and the 
Court’s doctrine. At the heart of Hosanna-Tabor, as well as of the entire 
concept of the Freedom of the Church, is the premise that religious 
institutions, as institutions, are entitled to substantial autonomy under the 
Religion Clauses. Rick Garnett goes so far as to describe the Freedom of 
the Church in terms of separate jurisdictional spheres of authority for 
government and religious institutions.
75
 But as Alan Brownstein has 
extensively pointed out in a recent article, there are serious reasons to 
doubt if many, or most, of the Framing generation would have supported 
such an institutional view of religious freedom.
76
 The reasons for this are 
 
 
 70. Id. at *7–*10. 
 71. Id. at *11–*16. 
 72. Id. at *16 n.16. See also Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Port of Portland, Or., No. CV04695HU, 2005 
WL 1109698 (D. Or. May 5, 2005), aff’d, 172 F. App’x 760 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting careful attention 
to free speech claims against a rule requiring a permit before leafleting at Portland’s airport, but 
dismissing a free exercise claim summarily on the basis of Smith). 
 73. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text. 
 74. See infra Part IV. As I discuss later, there may well be an argument that the Free Exercise 
Clause may permit religious groups to claim autonomy rights on behalf of their members, which 
perhaps might be understood as a quid pro quo for the limitations placed on such groups by the 
Establishment Clause. Id.  
 75. Garnett, supra note 3, at 42–44; see also Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 3, at 922. 
 76. See Brownstein, supra note 46. 
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rooted in the nature of religious practice in the United States at the time of 
the Framing.  
The Framing generation was overwhelmingly Protestant, as Catholics 
made up less than 1% of the population in 1787.
77
 Contemporary 
Protestant theology, and defenses of religious liberty, rested fundamentally 
on the principle that each individual should have the right to read the 
scriptures and to judge religious matters for himself.
78
 James Madison’s 
own defense of religious liberty in his famous 1785 Memorial and 
Remonstrance (directed at Episcopalian Virginia) rested essentially on 
these grounds: religious freedom was grounded in the right of each 
individual to pray to the Creator as he chose.
79
 It is in this context that we 
must read Madison’s proposal to Congress in 1789 (based on George 
Mason’s similar language) that the Constitution be amended to protect 
“the full and equal rights of conscience.”80 All of the focus here, rooted in 
post-Reformation theological developments as well as Enlightenment 
thinking, is on the individual freedom of conscience and belief. 
The ugly flip side of the Framers’ Protestant vision of religion was a 
virulent anti-Catholicism. Brownstein extensively catalogues proof of the 
widespread nature of this antipathy,
81
 which was very much present among 
the Framers. At the very birth of the Revolution, the colonists listed as one 
of the “Intolerable Acts” adopted by the British Parliament the Quebec 
Act, in part because it granted free exercise to Catholics in newly-
conquered Quebec.
82
 Prominent revolutionaries such as John Adams, 
Samuel Adams, and John Jay expressed similar views, the latter two going 
so far as to argue that Catholics did not deserve religious toleration at all.
83
 
The basis for these anti-Catholic feelings was not only historical rivalry, 
but also the hierarchical nature of the Catholic Church, which many in the 
Framing generation saw as directly opposed to religious liberty.
84
 In other 
words, it was precisely the fact that Catholicism was the preeminent 
example of a religious institution existing distinctly from members that led 
many leading Protestant thinkers of the time, including leading Framers, to 
 
 
 77. Id. at 221, 223 (citing JAMES M. O’NEILL, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 17 
(2006)); see also Eduardo Penalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 812–13 (1997) 
(arguing the modern concept of religion was formulated in an almost entirely Protestant context). 
 78. Brownstein, supra note 46, at 220–22. 
 79. Id. at 222 & n.59. 
 80. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 81. Brownstein, supra note 46, at 223–33. 
 82. Id. at 227–28. 
 83. Id. at 231 & n.109. 
 84. Id. at 229–33. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS 89 
 
 
 
 
view the Church as unworthy of tolerance. These attitudes cut strongly 
against an institutional vision of religious liberty.
85
 
This is not to say the Framers saw religion in purely individual terms. 
Christian worship has always been strongly communal, and from the very 
beginning of the Reformation, Protestant leaders recognized the 
importance of religious groups and group worship.
86
 For many Protestants 
in late eighteenth century America, however, the quintessential religious 
group was not a complex, hierarchical institution; it was a local, 
democratically-controlled congregation.
87
 This structure grew out of not 
only the historical roots of American religious life at the frontier but also 
the Protestant commitment to individual conscience and to principles of 
self-government that eventually erupted in the American Revolution.
88
 
This point should not be overstated. Certainly, as Brownstein concedes, 
over time, Protestant denominations in America had developed 
institutional structures and some forms of hierarchical organization, which 
many supported.
89
 The point is simply that, given the Framing 
generation’s views on religion, the result reached in Hosanna-Tabor, 
which grants greater protection to religious group autonomy than to 
individual conscience, is hard to defend. 
Moreover, this understanding of the basically individualistic focus of 
the Religion Clauses is entirely consistent with two historical episodes, 
both involving James Madison, recounted by the Hosanna-Tabor Court. In 
the first, Madison, acting as Secretary of State, refused to give advice to 
Catholic leaders about who should be appointed to direct the Church’s 
affairs in the Louisiana Purchase.
90
 In the second, President Madison 
vetoed a bill to incorporate an Episcopalian church in Alexandria on the 
grounds that the bill established internal procedures for the church, 
including procedures for election and removal of clergy, all in violation of 
the Establishment Clause.
91
 These episodes establish that the 
Establishment Clause forbids the government from getting involved in 
 
 
 85. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 3, at 952–53 (recounting evidence of hostility to 
institutional religion in the Framing era). 
 86. Brownstein, supra note 46, at 216; Inazu, supra note 6, at 344–45; John D. Inazu, Between 
Liberalism and Theocracy, 33 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591, 596–98 (2011). 
 87. See Brownstein, supra note 46, at 233 & n.112. 
 88. Id. at 239–41; see also James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular 
Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 302–03 (1990) (noting the role 
of “self-government” in local religious congregations). 
 89. Brownstein, supra note 46, at 249–52. 
 90. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School and Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 703 
(2012). 
 91. Id. at 703–04. 
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explicitly ecclesiastical decisions requiring ecclesiastical judgments, but 
the stories say little about whether religious institutions are subject to 
secular regulation through laws such as the ADA. 
Beyond federal law, historical evidence suggests that many of the 
Framers believed the State did have a role to play in regulating religious 
institutions. For example, in the period following the American 
Revolution, during the same time that the states were eliminating their 
religious establishments, many states imposed strict limits on the amount 
of income and/or property that churches were permitted to earn or 
possess.
92
 States also regulated the internal structure of religious groups to 
ensure their democratic nature through legislation granting lay boards of 
trustees, elected by congregations, control over the property of churches 
and the power to appoint ministers.
93
 Such laws inevitably created 
conflicts with the institutional Catholic Church, which had very different 
ideas about such powers. By and large, in such conflicts, the public, 
including many American Catholics, and the states supported lay, 
democratic control.
94
 This is not to say that all members of that generation 
supported such a view, but it is clear that many members of the Framing 
generation, probably a majority, believed strongly in such a local, 
democratic model for congregations. More significantly, the Framing 
generation was willing to let state governments, at the very time that they 
were eliminating their own religious establishments, impose such a model 
of control on churches. 
As Schragger and Schwartzman point out, defenses of the Freedom of 
the Church based on a theory of independent sovereignty seem to demand 
a democratic structure for churches, since only then could such separate 
sovereignty be reconciled with Republicanism and popular sovereignty.
95
 
Unlike many members of the Framing generation, however, Schragger and 
Schwartzman (and I) take this problem to argue not for imposing a 
democratic structure on religious denominations, but rather against 
recognizing such a strong form of institutional religious autonomy rooted 
in the Religion Clauses. While this point will be developed in greater 
detail later,
96
 it is important to note here that protecting religious groups’ 
autonomy under the Assembly Clause and/or freedom of association does 
 
 
 92. Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and Property 
Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307, 311–12, 321–23 (2014). 
 93. Id. at 311, 333–35; Brownstein, supra note 46, at 258–60. 
 94. Id. at 260–61; Gordon, supra note 92, at 347–55. 
 95. Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 3, at 944. 
 96. See infra Part III.  
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not pose the same problems. This is because assemblies and associations 
do not purport to operate outside of democratic society but rather as an 
essential ingredient of such a society—even those groups that separate 
themselves to some extent in order to nurture idiosyncratic values. Within 
that context, and so long as membership in an assembly or association is 
voluntary, the State can and must grant such groups wide autonomy to 
structure themselves as they will, encompassing everything from 
hierarchical, international groups such as the Catholic Church or the 
Communist International, to unstructured, purely local groups. 
C. Purposes 
This takes us to the more basic question of why group rights are best 
secured through assembly or association rather than through the Religion 
Clauses. The answer, I submit, lies in the very different purposes of the 
Religion Clauses, on the one hand, and what I will call the democratic 
First Amendment—speech, the press, assembly, association, and 
petition—on the other. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to 
explore the history and internal structure of the First Amendment. Such an 
exploration demonstrates fundamental differences in the history and 
purposes of the Religion Clauses and the rest of the First Amendment.  
The First Amendment as a whole reads as follows: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.
97
 
At first reading, this text, consisting of a single sentence, suggests a group 
of closely related rights, listed together because of their common roots in 
notions of freedom of conscience and individual dignity: religion, speech 
and the press, assembly for the purposes of petition. However, the text is 
highly misleading. For one thing, John Inazu has convincingly 
demonstrated that historically, assembly and petition were independent 
rights, constituting a right of “peaceably assembling and consulting for 
their common good” (to use the language of James Madison’s original 
proposal to Congress),
98
 as well as a separate right to petition the 
 
 
 97. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 98. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, & ORIGINS 129 (Neil H. 
Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. 
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legislature.
99
 More important, the various elements of the First 
Amendment were not listed as a single proposal in the original proposed 
Bill of Rights as introduced to Congress by James Madison. Rather, they 
were listed as three separate proposals in three separate sentences: the first 
protecting religious rights (including “full and equal rights of 
conscience”), a second protecting speech and the press, and the third 
protecting assembly and petition.
100
  
Even more tellingly, George Mason’s “Master Draft” of the Bill of 
Rights, which provided the template both for many of the proposed 
amendments that emerged from state ratifying conventions and for 
Madison’s own proposals to Congress, did not even list the precursors to 
the Religion Clauses near the other rights protected by the First 
Amendment.
101
 Instead, the rights of assembly and petition, as well as a 
rejected right to instruct Representatives, constituted proposal number 
fifteen in the Master Draft. Speech and the press are number sixteen, but 
the precursors of the Religion Clauses do not appear until proposal twenty 
(the last of the proposed amendments).
102
 Similarly, in the 1776 Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, which had a deep influence on the shaping of the 
Bill of Rights, religious liberty does not appear till the sixteenth clause, 
while the press is protected in clause twelve. Speech and assembly do not 
appear at all.
103
 Indeed, the Religion Clauses did not become combined 
with the rest of the First Amendment until very late in the congressional 
deliberations, emerging (without explanation) in this form from the Senate 
on September 9, 1789, just a few weeks before the Amendment was 
adopted by Congress.
104
 This uncontested fact provides an important clue 
that the Religion Clauses are different from the rest of the First 
Amendment.  
The differences between the Religion Clauses and the democratic First 
Amendment come down to fundamentally different purposes. As we will 
explore in more detail below,
105
 it is widely accepted that the speech, 
press, assembly and petition provisions of the First Amendment serve 
fundamentally instrumental goals—to further democratic self-governance. 
In contrast, it seems relatively clear, based on its language, drafting 
 
 
 99. Inazu, supra note 29, at 573–77. 
 100. AMENDMENTS OFFERED IN CONGRESS BY JAMES MADISON JUNE 8, 1789, supra note 55. 
 101. GEORGE MASON’S MASTER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, ¶¶ 15–16, 20. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), AVALON PROJECT, available at http://avalon.law. 
yale.edu/18th_century/virginia.asp (last visited June 2, 2014).  
 104. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 133, 139. 
 105. See infra Part III.A. 
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history, and general cultural background, that the primary purpose of the 
Free Exercise Clause was to protect individual conscience: the right of 
people to worship as they chose.
106
 In other words, its purpose is 
fundamentally dignitary. Certainly, protecting such dignitary concerns also 
advances instrumental values,
107
 and that may well be have been a 
secondary motivation. But as the language of Madison’s and Mason’s 
original proposals make clear, at the heart of Free Exercise is freedom of 
individual conscience.
108
 
Dignitary interests, however, provide a very weak basis for protecting 
groups as groups.
109
 It is very hard to see how an institution can have a 
conscience. In his Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison argued that the 
reason to protect religious liberty is to ensure that believers are not forced 
to choose between salvation and legal obligation.
110
 But again, groups do 
not seek or obtain salvation, except on behalf of their members. Of course, 
religious groups can invoke the Free Exercise Clause as a means to 
advance the dignitary interests of their members, and sometimes quite 
effectively so. Thus a law banning religious worship on Saturdays could 
certainly be challenged by a synagogue or a Seventh-day Adventist 
Church as violating the Free Exercise rights of its members, since the 
religious institutions in that situation would almost certainly meet the 
requirements of organizational standing.
111
  
If the Court were ever to reconsider its decision in Smith and breathe 
serious life back into the Free Exercise Clause, those derivative rights of 
groups might become quite extensive. But these rights are derivative: they 
are not rights of religious groups qua groups and have little relevance to 
institutional claims by complex organizations. There may well be cases 
where an antidiscrimination claim by a minister would implicate the free-
exercise rights of church members, if the lawsuit truly impinged on their 
ability to worship as they chose. But surely not every lawsuit by every 
 
 
 106. See supra Part II.A for a more lengthy description of the drafting history of the Religion 
Clauses. For more lengthy defenses of the position that the Religion Clauses serve dignitary interests, 
see Brownstein, supra note 46, at 207–18. 
 107. I have previously argued for a more purely instrumental, structural reading of the Free 
Exercise Clause. ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 124–34 (2010). I now demur. 
 108. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
 109. For similar arguments, see Brownstein, supra note 46, at 207–18; Schragger & Schwartzman, 
supra note 3, at 965–66. 
 110. Micah Schwartzman, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1365–66 
(2012). 
 111. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977); Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738–39 & n.14 (1972). 
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“minister” as broadly defined by the Hosanna-Tabor Court implicates 
such concerns.  
It becomes clear from this perspective that the sheer scope of the 
ministerial exception fits poorly with a dignitary theory based on the 
derivative free-exercise rights of churches. After all, the exception by its 
terms applies without any requirement that the Church prove some sort of 
interference with its religious practices or the religious practices of its 
members. On the facts of Hosanna-Tabor itself, it is hard to see how the 
school’s decision to fire Perich because she consulted counsel had much 
direct relationship to the church’s parishioners’ freedom of conscience. 
Perhaps if the firing had involved the quality or content of Perich’s 
teaching such a link could be proved—though even that seems a stretch 
since she taught primarily secular materials. At heart the dispute between 
Perich and Hosanna-Tabor was a managerial one, touching only lightly on 
religious matters. To grant a blanket dispensation to the church in those 
circumstances may or may not make sense, but it has little to do with 
individual dignity and freedom. To the contrary, the only obvious 
dignitary interests at stake in the case were Perich’s, which the Court 
ignored entirely. 
Group rights then, especially broad, prophylactic rights of the sort 
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, cannot easily be defended in dignitary 
terms. The implications of this should be clear. First, it means that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not provide a solid foundation for such rights. 
Second, it means that if group rights are to be defended, it must be in 
instrumental, not dignitary terms. The Free Exercise Clause is simply not a 
viable source of group rights. 
The Establishment Clause is, concededly, a little bit different. While 
the Establishment Clause no doubt protects dignitary interests,
112
 it also 
clearly serves an instrumental goal. That instrumental purpose, however, is 
relatively narrow: to prevent the social discord that results from sectarian 
strife over control of the state. Given the Framers’ intimate knowledge of 
the religious wars that had devastated Great Britain and the rest of Europe 
in the prior century, this would have been a primary consideration in their 
 
 
 112. One way it protects dignitary interests is through its prohibition on the imposition of taxes to 
fund the clergy. It was precisely such a legislative proposal that elicited Madison’s foundational 
“Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” in 1785, see JAMES MADISON, 
MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), available at 
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html (last visited June 2, 2014), 
which in turn was one of the earliest steps in the dis-establishment movement in the early United 
States. 
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minds.
113
 In perhaps its most thoughtful opinion on the subject, this is 
precisely the position adopted by the Supreme Court.
114
 Important, indeed 
critical, to a well-functioning society as this goal is, it is hard to 
understand what it has to do with the ministerial exception. The 
Establishment Clause clearly condemns government actions that favor or 
disfavor particular sects. Indeed, such preferentialism was the target of 
George Mason’s original proposal on the subject.115 But it is hard to see 
how the application of a neutral employment regulation to all sects and all 
secular groups, without preferentialism, threatens this value. Admittedly, 
in an extreme case where a law is passed by a religious majority precisely 
to interfere with the practices of a minority sect, concern might arise,
116
 
but no one suggests such an explanation for the ADA or any other 
antidiscrimination statute. Further, the Free Exercise Clause would forbid 
such an extreme situation, even post-Smith.
117
 The Establishment Clause 
does no work here. The conclusion seems inescapable: the Religion 
Clauses simply cannot justify the ministerial exception recognized in 
Hosanna-Tabor. 
D. Boundaries 
The above discussion demonstrates the holes in the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court’s legal reasoning in placing the ministerial exception in the Religion 
Clauses. An entirely separate problem with the Court’s approach is that it 
raises a host of boundary problems that are ultimately unresolvable. One 
immediate question that arises is scope of the ministerial exception: does it 
bar all litigation against churches? All litigation by ministers against 
churches? Or just antidiscrimination suits brought by ministers against 
 
 
 113. As Madison made clear in his Memorial and Remonstrance, see id. ¶ 11 (“Torrents of blood 
have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious disscord 
[sic],by proscribing all difference in Religious opinion.”). 
 114. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962). 
 115. See GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, ¶ 20 (“[N]o 
particular religious Sect or Society of Christians ought to be favored or established by Law in 
preference to others.”). 
 116. I leave aside here the question of whether such a law, to trigger concerns, must be 
subjectively motivated to discriminate against a minority, or whether a law which to an objective 
observer seems to single out a religious minority would also be suspect. The question has of course 
arisen extensively in the context of the Equal Protection Clause and remains extremely divisive. For a 
discussion of the difficulties of defining intent, see Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh Bhagwat, The 
McCleskey Puzzle: Remedying Prosecutorial Discrimination Against Black Victims In Capital 
Sentencing, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 145, 150–55. 
 117. See generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
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churches? The EEOC and Perich argued that recognizing a ministerial 
exception would raise questions about the application, for example, of 
immigration or child labor laws to churches.
118
 The Court’s answer was 
simply to fudge. It suggested that “the ministerial exception would not in 
any way bar criminal prosecutions . . . [or] bar government enforcement of 
general laws restricting eligibility for employment, because the exception 
applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves,”119 but did 
not resolve the scope of church immunity with respect to ministers 
themselves. Instead, the Court limited its holding sharply to prohibit “an 
employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, 
challenging her church’s decision to fire her.”120  
This is quite dissatisfying. Despite the soaring language of the Freedom 
of the Church advocates, there must be some limits on even internal 
church autonomy, for surely we would not permit a church to engage in 
human sacrifice of volunteer priests or congregational members.
121
 Given 
the absolutist language of the Court’s opinion, however, it is very unclear 
how lines would be drawn. After all, many different kinds of government 
regulations, including child labor laws and even laws forbidding human 
sacrifice, can be described as “government interference with an internal 
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself,”122 
depending on the church’s theological beliefs. So how is a court to pick 
and choose which regulations are permissible and which are not? Why is it 
that the Court singles out antidiscrimination laws for disfavored treatment? 
Surely these laws do not interfere with church autonomy more than many 
others, down to such pedestrian regulations as health and safety codes. If 
all these laws are constitutionally suspect, then Smith is surely dead. 
Another difficult boundary problem, raised and also elided in Hosanna-
Tabor, is the definition of which employees qualify as “ministers” for the 
purposes of the ministerial exception. The Court split three ways on this 
question, with the majority opinion simply citing a number of relevant 
factors without giving any guidance as to how to resolve close cases.
123
 
 
 
 118. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School and Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 
(2012). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Mark D. Rosen, Religious Institutions, Liberal States, and the Political Architecture of 
Overlapping Spheres, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 747–48 (using this example to critique the “separate 
sphere” argument for church autonomy). 
 122. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. This was the basis upon which the Hosanna-Tabor Court 
distinguished Smith. Id.  
 123. Id. at 707–08. 
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The two concurrences pointed in quite opposite directions, with Justice 
Thomas arguing for complete deference to churches on this question and 
Justice Alito championing a clear, functional test.
124
 The difficulty, which 
both Justices Thomas and Alito acknowledged, though it led them in 
different directions, is that the definition of a minister is fundamentally a 
theological and ecclesiastical question.
125
 To resolve such a question, a 
court must resolve questions of religious meaning, which goes against the 
purpose of the ministerial exception. Hosanna-Tabor, as well as the line of 
cases involving church property disputes upon which the majority 
relied,
126
 sought to ensure that courts are not placed in such a role.  
This conundrum cannot be avoided by the majority’s test, which turns 
on such obviously ecclesiastical factors as the employee’s title and formal 
ordination, and whether the employee performs religious duties. These 
factors raise problematic questions such as: what makes a title equivalent 
to minister? How is a court to judge what constitutes “ordination”? And 
what makes a particular duty religious?  
The problem is compounded, as Justice Alito recognized, by the 
extraordinary religious diversity in the modern United States, which 
results in enormous variations in organization and leadership of religious 
groups.
127
 Justice Alito sought to avoid this problem by eschewing reliance 
on such obviously Christian factors as the use of the term “minister,” or 
formal ordination, and instead focus on function. But his test, which 
defined a minister as “any ‘employee’ who leads a religious organization, 
conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or 
serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith,”128 still requires courts to 
resolve ecclesiastical questions such as what constitutes “worship 
services” and what are “important religious ceremonies or rituals.” Justice 
Thomas’s approach, admittedly, does avoid this problem, but at the cost of 
permitting such unlikely results as allowing a church to designate the 
building engineer in Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos as a minister.
129
 
Yet another fundamental boundary problem raised by rooting the 
ministerial exception in the Religion Clauses and restricting it to religious 
 
 
 124. Id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 714–16 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 125. See Corbin, supra note 3, at 966. 
 126. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704–05 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872); 
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). 
 127. Id. at 711 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 129. See generally 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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institutions is that this requires courts to define what constitutes a religious 
group—i.e., what is the definition of a church. This problem is intractable. 
There is a substantial, extant literature seeking to define the term 
“religion” for the purposes of the Religion Clauses, with no particular 
success.
130
 As for the courts, while they have little difficulty classifying 
such familiar sects as the Missouri Synod Lutheran Church in Hosanna-
Tabor as religious, they struggle enormously when faced with less familiar 
traditions.
131
  
If the problem of defining religion is difficult, the problem of defining 
what constitutes a church is even more complicated. This is because many 
organizations that have some unambiguously religious elements probably 
do not qualify as churches entitled to the ministerial exception, while 
similar groups might well qualify. Consider in this regard the Boy Scouts. 
Clearly the Boy Scouts have a religious component to them, as reflected 
by the Scouts’ exclusion of atheist or agnostic scouts and scout leaders.132 
On the other hand, it seems peculiar to describe the Scouts as a church, or 
scouting leaders as ministers, and there was no mention of the ministerial 
exception in the Dale litigation. But why are the Scouts different from a 
Quaker congregation?  
As John Inazu points out, the division between churches and other 
religious groups has been complicated in recent years by the tendency of 
Evangelical Christians to associate increasingly with “parachurches” 
rather than formal congregations.
133
 At some point, the question of 
whether a particular group constitutes a church, just like the question of 
whether a particular person constitutes a minister, becomes an 
ecclesiastical one based on one’s definition of what is or is not sufficiently 
religious activity. Courts have no place making such judgments, yet the 
ministerial exception forces them to do precisely that. An alternative 
approach rooted in assembly and association, which treats secular and 
religious groups the same, avoids this choice. 
 
 
 130. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 
579; George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 
71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. 
REV. 753 (1984); Eduardo Penalver, supra note 77; Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of 
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). 
 131. Contrast Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (defining transcendental meditation as 
a religion for Establishment Clause purposes) with Sedlock v. Baird, No. 37-2013-00035910-CU-MC-
CTL (Superior Court of California, County of San Diego July 1, 2013) (stating yoga as taught in a 
public school is not religion). 
 132. Duty to God, BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA LEGAL ISSUES WEBSITE & BLAWG (2006), available 
at http://web.archive.org/web/20080509074048/http://www.bsalegal.org/duty-to-god-cases-224.asp.  
 133. Inazu, supra note 6, at 363–66. 
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The ultimate problem is that the dignitary interests that underlie the 
Religion Clauses provide no clear basis for line drawing. If autonomy of 
religious groups is rooted in protecting the dignitary interests of members, 
then deciding which groups receive protection and which employees 
qualify as ministers must turn on the religious significance of the group 
and individual. But this sort of governmental inquiry into the nature and 
strength of individual religious beliefs is deeply troubling under the 
Religion Clauses. On the other hand, to abjure such an inquiry leads to 
relentless expansion of religious autonomy, culminating in claims that 
owners of for-profit businesses may opt out of secular regulatory mandates 
which conflict with their religious tenets. In the face of such challenges to 
the contraceptive mandate in President Obama’s healthcare reform 
legislation, the lower courts were divided,
134
 though the Supreme Court 
did eventually uphold the businesses’ claims.135 Regardless of the Court’s 
decision, however, recognizing such religious exemptions is quite 
problematic. Not only does doing so discriminate against nonreligious, 
ethical perspectives—itself a profound problem under free-speech 
principles
136—but if followed consistently, it could lead to the evisceration 
of much of the modern regulatory state, including antidiscrimination laws, 
at least as applied to smaller and closely-held businesses. 
The logical implications of the above discussion seem clear: if strong 
group-autonomy rights cannot be derived from dignitary interests, then 
they must be justified on some other, more instrumental basis. This fact 
alone makes the Religion Clauses a poor home for such rights: Free 
Exercise because it sounds primarily in dignitary concerns and 
Establishment because the instrumental values it advances in addition to 
dignitary interests do not support exemptions from generally applicable 
legislation for religious groups. However, this does not doom group-
 
 
 134. Compare Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), 
aff’d Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (finding that the contraceptive mandate, as 
imposed on a for-profit corporation, violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Korte v. 
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (same); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 
F.3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that the contraceptive mandate likely violated the rights of owners 
of a closely held corporation) with Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (concluding that a for-profit corporation may not bring claims under either the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act or the Free Exercise Clause); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th 
Cir. 2013) (same). Interestingly, in granting protection to a for-profit corporation, the Tenth Circuit 
explicitly held that Hosanna-Tabor’s grant of autonomy to religious organizations—i.e., churches—
did not preclude granting rights to nonreligious organizations as well. See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 
1136. 
 135. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 136. See Schwartzman, supra note 110, at 1374. 
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autonomy rights. Even if the Religion Clauses do not advance the sorts of 
instrumental concerns that justify some version of a ministerial exception, 
other parts of the First Amendment do. It is to the rest of the First 
Amendment that we now turn. 
III. REDEEMING HOSANNA-TABOR 
Up to this point, we have seen that the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment in fact provide a very weak foundation for the ministerial 
exemption recognized in Hosanna-Tabor. That does not mean, however, 
that the case was incorrectly decided. To the contrary, as we shall see there 
are very strong reasons, rooted in constitutional theory and structure, why 
we should shield the internal workings of religious groups from 
government regulation. The logical source of those principles, however, 
lies not in the Religion Clauses but in the later provisions of the First 
Amendment—what I call the Democratic First Amendment. 
A. The Democratic First Amendment 
Whatever the uncertainties surrounding the dignitary and instrumental 
aims of the Religion Clauses, there is a much broader consensus regarding 
the primarily instrumental goals of the remaining provisions of the First 
Amendment, which are free speech, freedom of the press, peaceable 
assembly, and petition.
137
 Furthermore, there is little doubt as to what that 
instrumental goal is: furthering democratic self-governance. Taking the 
last two provisions first, there seems to be no plausible argument that the 
rights to assembly and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances serve any dignitary, natural-rights values. Rather, they are 
purely about self-governance and democratic accountability. This is more 
obvious with respect to petitioning—it is hard to imagine anyone who 
would consider petitioning the government a key aspect of self-identity or 
self-fulfillment, and the text is quite explicit that the purpose of petitioning 
was not self-fulfillment, but rather to secure a redress of grievances. 
The same point may not be quite as obvious with regard to assembly, 
until one remembers the roots of this right. As originally proposed by 
Madison and Mason, the right of assembly was one of the people to 
peaceably assemble “and consult for their common Good.”138 The latter 
 
 
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 138. GEORGE MASON’S MASTER DRAFT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, ¶ 15; 
AMENDMENTS OFFERED IN CONGRESS BY JAMES MADISON JUNE 8, 1789, supra note 55. There is a 
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restriction makes clear that when the people assemble, they do so in their 
sovereign capacity and not to pursue their personal ends.
139
 When the 
“consult for the common Good” language was dropped from the proposed 
amendment,
140
 the legislative record gives no indication that the reason for 
removing this language was to change the underlying purpose of the right. 
If anything, the record suggests that the language was dropped to ensure 
that the government did not seize upon this language to bar legitimate 
assemblies.
141
 Moreover, the sparse legislative history we have of the 
Assembly Clause leaves little doubt that the Framers were intimately 
aware of the link between assembly and democratic self-governance.
142
 
There also seems to be little doubt about the fundamentally 
instrumental goals of the Press Clause. Again, the drafting history is 
helpful. Madison’s original proposal read: “the freedom of the press, as 
one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”143 Mason’s 
proposal was essentially the same.
144
 This language clearly protects the 
press because of its political function, not because of the dignitary 
interests of writers. Furthermore, the literature recognizing the key, 
instrumental role the press plays in a functioning democracy is 
extensive.
145
  
So that leaves speech. It is true that over the years, in addition to its 
widely acknowledged role in sustaining a republican form of government, 
scholars and judges have pointed to speech’s instrumental role in the 
“search for truth”146 and its dignitary role in advancing individual self-
fulfillment.
147
 In the modern era, however, the vast majority of scholars 
and courts, including the Supreme Court, have endorsed the view that the 
central, if not necessarily the only, goal of the Free Speech Clause is to 
 
 
slight verb tense difference between Mason and Madison (“assemble and consult” versus “assembling 
and consulting”) but they are identical in substance. 
 139. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 26–30 
(1998). 
 140. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 133.  
 141. See Inazu, supra note 29, at 571–73. 
 142. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 98, at 143–45. 
 143. AMENDMENTS OFFERED IN CONGRESS BY JAMES MADISON JUNE 8, 1789, supra note 55. 
 144. GEORGE MASON’S MASTER BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 56, ¶16 (“The Freedom of the Press 
is one of the great Bulwarks of Liberty, and ought not to be violated.”). 
 145. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 
(1983); Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
 146. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 20–22 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 1998) (1859); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 147. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47–69 (1989); THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4–7 (1966). 
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advance democracy. I have defended this position elsewhere,
148
 and Jim 
Weinstein and Robert Post have expounded the same position far more 
ably than me.
149
 I will not repeat these arguments here, but rather will 
proceed on the assumption that the four rights listed in the latter part of the 
First Amendment, separately and jointly, have the primary goal of 
enabling and sustaining popular sovereignty and democratic self-
governance. 
Two further clarifications are necessary regarding the specifics 
whereby First Amendment rights advance self-governance. The first is that 
while the four great rights are independent of each other, they are not 
unrelated. There seems little doubt that these rights operate in tandem, 
combining with each other to better effectuate citizen participation in 
governance.
150
 Thus people assemble for many reasons, but one of them is 
to petition. Speech enables assembly, and vice versa. They are, in the 
Court’s own words, “cognate rights.”151 The second point is that citizens’ 
involvement in self-governance is not limited to voting, or educating 
themselves to vote, nor is it limited to polite debate.
152
 Instead, it 
incorporates a vast amount of activity and organization relevant to being a 
citizen, including protesting, petitioning, and other obviously political 
activities, as well as activities which form values, build organizations and 
common interests, and more generally enable separation between the 
sovereign people and the state. Indeed, in the founding era—and in truth, 
until the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920
153—most adults 
were disenfranchised, and so participation in such activities was the only 
thing that permitted most citizens to act as citizens.
154
 
There thus seems to be a substantial gap between the Religion Clauses 
and the rest of the First Amendment.
155
 The Religion Clauses primarily 
advance dignitary interests and seek to prevent conflict due to religious 
preferentialism, while the speech, press, assembly and petition clauses 
 
 
 148. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 
32–35 (2012). 
 149. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 (2011); Robert 
C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic 
Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990); James Weinstein, 
Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 
(2011). 
 150. Bhagwat, supra note 28, at 995. 
 151. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
 152. Bhagwat, supra note 28, at 995–98. 
 153. U.S. Const. amend XIX (forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex in voting). 
 154. See Bhagwat, supra note 28, at 993. 
 155. See supra Parts II, III.A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS 103 
 
 
 
 
advance popular sovereignty.
156
 That two different parts of the same 
Amendment have such different goals may seem odd, until one remembers 
that attaching the Religion Clauses to the later rights seems to have been 
more of an historical accident than anything else—as originally proposed, 
the Religion Clauses were distinct and unconnected to other First 
Amendment rights.
157
  
What is striking, however, is how often, when examining the 
arguments in favor of religious rights for groups, they seem to fit more 
closely with self-governance than traditional Religion Clause values. 
Richard Garnett is perhaps the leading modern defender of the Freedom of 
the Church under the Religion Clauses. Yet when Garnett explains why 
church autonomy is important, he tends to fall back upon reasons 
grounded in democracy. Garnett describes churches as one kind of non-
governmental group that contributes to the balance of power in a 
democratic system of government,
158
 and also, along with the press, to a 
“civil-society space” within which citizens can speak and develop values 
free of the government.
159
 Garnett goes so far as to acknowledge that 
churches in the modern state “deliver the same Tocquevillian benefits as 
any number of voluntary associations,” all the while inexplicably insisting 
that religion is special and religious groups differ from secular ones for 
constitutional purposes.
160
 Similarly, Paul Horowitz’s defense of church 
autonomy relies on the role of churches, like other “First Amendment 
Institutions,” in enabling public discourse and thus democracy as well.161 
In Hosanna-Tabor itself, Justice Alito’s thoughtful concurrence explicitly 
invokes cases such as Roberts and Dale protecting expressive associations 
to justify the ministerial exception.
162
 All of this suggests that the Solicitor 
General’s efforts, supported by some previous scholarship,163 to root the 
ministerial exception in association and assembly rather than the Religion 
Clauses was neither “untenable” nor “remarkable,” contrary to the 
Hosanna-Tabor majority.
164
 
 
 
 156. For a similar conclusion, see Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 91 (2006). 
 157. See supra Part II.C. 
 158. See Garnett, supra note 3, at 38–39. 
 159. Id. at 40–41. 
 160. Id. at 49–50. 
 161. HORWITZ, supra note 42, at 82–84, 176. 
 162. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School and Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 163. See Tushnet, supra note 6, at 84–86; Lupu, supra note 6, at 431–42. 
 164. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. 
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There is nothing ahistorical about protecting religious groups through 
the Assembly Clause and the modern, derivative association right. As John 
Inazu points out, during the brief debates that were recorded in the First 
Congress regarding the Assembly Clause, a specific reference was made to 
the arrest of William Penn in England for illegally assembling in order to 
worship.
165
 This shows solid historical precedent and evidence exists that 
the Assembly Clause protects all groups, both secular and religious. It 
further shows that the Assembly Clause protects religious groups not only 
when they are engaging in expression, but also when they gather to 
worship or for other religious purposes.  
This conclusion, it should be noted, utterly undermines the modern 
Supreme Court’s theory166 that assembly and association are only 
protected if they are for expressive purposes. Worship, after all, may have 
expressive elements to it, but it is not solely or even at heart a merely 
expressive activity.
167
 It also strongly suggests that lower court decisions 
granting greater protection to religious groups’ expressive activities than 
to their religious activities are also mistaken.
168
 The Assembly Clause 
protects many kinds of groups, including expressive groups, groups 
assembled to petition the government, and religious groups, because all of 
these groups contribute to the maintenance of a free society of sovereign 
citizens within a democratic form of government.
169
 Indeed, given the 
significant role played by ministers in fomenting rebellion, both during the 
American Revolution and in seventeenth century England, it is far from 
clear that the Framers would have distinguished between religion and 
politics as such. 
 
 
 165. Inazu, supra note 29, at 575–76 (citing THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 
144 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 760 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834))). 
 166. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 
609, 622–23, 626–27 (1984). 
 167. See INAZU, supra note 28, at 141–44, 164–68. 
 168. See supra Part II.A (discussing Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs of N.J., 919 F.2d 
183 (3d Cir. 1990) and Wiley Mission v. New Jersey, No. 10-3024, 2011 WL 3841437 (D.N.J. Aug. 
25, 2011).). 
 169. It should be noted in this regard that in one of its foundational freedom-of-association cases, 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Supreme Court explicitly described the association right as “a right to 
associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, 
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion,” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 
thus clearly extending protecting beyond expressive groups. The Court’s description elsewhere of the 
right as one “to associate for expressive purposes,” id. at 623, or as “freedom of expressive 
association,” Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, may thus simply be a shorthand for a broader right. Even the 
Court’s broader description of the right, however, is too narrow, because it ignores the fact that the 
right of association/assembly is an independent right, not derivative of other First Amendment rights. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS 105 
 
 
 
 
B. The Instrumental Value of Groups 
In addition to fitting well with the text, history and underlying purposes 
of the First Amendment, locating group religious rights in the Assembly 
Clause also avoids many of the worst line-drawing problems raised by 
reliance on the Religion Clauses. This is because dignitary theories of the 
sort driving the Free Exercise Clause have generally provided little 
guidance on boundaries. After all, human dignity is an entirely subjective, 
individualistic notion, and any activity can arguably be central to 
someone’s definition of self. Instrumental theories, on the other hand, ask 
a clearer question: does the regulated activity further the instrumental 
goals of the constitutional provision? In the assembly/association context, 
the boundary question then becomes: does the type of group being 
regulated play a significant role in effectuating democratic self-
governance? If so, does the challenged regulation interfere with the 
group’s ability to play that role? These questions will not, of course, 
always be easy to answer. In particular, there will undoubtedly be 
disagreements on whether particular types of groups such as commercial 
entities should be protected.
170
 But at least we know what the question is 
that we are answering. 
Under this approach, there is little doubt that essentially all religious 
groups, whether organized as formal churches or not, are entitled to full 
protection under the Assembly Clause. Religious groups have played a 
central role in American politics throughout history and continue to do so 
today. Actual political engagement, however, is not a prerequisite for 
protection. Instead, the concept of contributing to democratic self-
governance must be understood in capacious terms.
171
 For one thing, self-
governance itself is not limited to voting; it includes a myriad of activities 
that play a role in maintaining the balance of power between officials and 
the sovereign people, including petitioning, protesting, and discussing.
172
 
Without groups, most of these activities would be meaningless if not 
impossible because it is exceedingly difficult for citizens to capture the 
attention of rulers unless they act together, in numbers. 
In addition to providing vehicles for democratic action, groups also 
foster in citizens the basic values which define what kinds of citizen 
 
 
 170. Compare Bhagwat, supra note 28, at 1002, and INAZU, supra note 28, at 166–68 (they 
should not) with Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary is the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1403, 1413–15 (2012) (they should). 
 171. See supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 172. Including online. See John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2013). 
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individuals will be and, relatedly, in the Supreme Court’s words, act “as 
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State.”173 
Private groups are essential to this process of value formation both 
because humans form values in groups and because, absent the “buffer” 
provided by such groups, the state would have extraordinary power to 
shape its citizens, thereby inverting the assumptions that underlie popular 
sovereignty. Finally, once one recognizes this aspect of the role groups 
play in self-governance, it becomes self-evident that Justice Alito was 
quite correct to describe religious groups as “the preeminent example” of 
democratic associations.
174
  
Not only do religious groups play a central role in shaping citizens’ 
values through teaching and worship, but they also provide an important 
opportunity for citizens to develop the skills needed to be engaged, active 
citizens—a role for groups that has been acknowledged since 
Tocqueville.
175
 This insight is reinforced by the fact that the Framing 
generation was overwhelmingly Protestant and tended to favor (sometimes 
through law) church structures that were local and democratic.
176
 Such 
institutions provided opportunities to hone skills that could translate easily 
into local and eventually national politics. It should be emphasized, 
however, that given the significance of teaching and worship as shapers of 
citizens’ values, constitutional protection extends not just to 
democratically organized groups but also to hierarchical, autocratic 
organizations. 
An argument can be made, as Justice Alito suggests in Hosanna-
Tabor,
177
 that religious groups are especially well suited to advance self-
government. One reason for this is the stricter separation between religious 
groups and the state than secular groups and the state. Democratic 
associations advance popular sovereignty, among other ways, by acting as 
a source of values independent of the state and by providing what the 
Supreme Court has called a “buffer” between citizens and the state.178 To 
serve as a source of independent values and as an effective buffer, it is 
 
 
 173. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School and Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 712 
(2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See MARK E. WARREN, DEMOCRACY AND ASSOCIATION 29–30 (2001). 
 176. See supra Part II.A. 
 177. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Throughout our Nation’s history, 
religious bodies have been the preeminent example of private associations that have ‘act[ed] as critical 
buffers between the individual and the power of the State.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 619). 
 178. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619; see also Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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essential that groups retain independence from the state. One way in which 
associational independence can be compromised is through regulation, 
which is why the Assembly Clause acts as a barrier to such regulation. But 
regulation is not the only danger: the state can co-opt associations by 
creating dependency through voluntary financial support. Dependence on 
such support will inevitably compromise associational independence by 
making groups hesitant to bite the hand that feeds them. This danger is not 
theoretical, as the nation’s law schools discovered when they sought to 
challenge the military’s now-defunct policy of excluding gays and 
lesbians.
179
 As Alan Brownstein points out, however, religious groups are 
far less susceptible to this form of capture-by-funding than secular groups, 
because the Establishment Clause sharply limits the state’s ability to 
support religious groups.
180
 Admittedly, recent decisions such as Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris,
181
 which permits religious groups to participate in neutral 
funding schemes such as school vouchers, somewhat undermine this 
distinction. However, it remains true that the Establishment Clause is still 
a flat bar on government support for the core, religious and value-forming 
functions of religious groups, in a way with no secular parallel.  
Further strengths of religious groups vis-à-vis secular ones are their 
longevity and intergenerational nature, as well as the unusually strong 
communal ties that bind together many religious groups. In combination, 
these characteristics make religious groups especially independent and 
effective inculcators of cultural values. These characteristics also make 
religious groups particularly powerful shields against intrusions of the 
state, as demonstrated, for example, by African American churches during 
the Civil Rights era. None of these strengths are unique to religious 
groups, of course, but given the importance of membership in religious 
groups to the lives of many Americans, there is an argument that such 
groups provide an especially easy and likely vehicle for value formation 
and political participation. 
C. Politics and Religious Associations 
Protecting religious groups because of their contribution to self-
governance forces us to confront the difficult question of the appropriate 
 
 
 179. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
 180. Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the 
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause are 
Stronger when Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1708 (2011); 
Brownstein, supra note 156, at 93. 
 181. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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role of religious groups in a secular democracy. One reading of the 
Establishment Clause—in particular, prong one of the infamous Lemon 
test requiring that all legislation must have a “secular legislative 
purpose”182—might be understood to exclude all religious motivations, 
and thus all religious groups, from politics. But that cannot be correct. 
First of all, this obviously has not been our historical practice.
183
 More 
fundamentally, it does not correspond with our approach in other areas and 
and with other groups. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, legislation 
adopted with an explicitly racist or sexist purpose is unconstitutional.
184
 
Yet that does not mean that the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) or a male 
chauvinist political group can or must be excluded from politics.
185
 
Similarly, religious groups, speaking and acting with religious 
motivations, can still appropriately try and move public policy in the 
directions they want, so long as the policy can also be justified on some 
secular ground. Despite Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor,186 the 
Constitution has never been understood to entirely separate church and 
state to this degree, and quite rightly so. To the contrary, from the very 
beginning of our history, the Assembly Clause has been understood to 
protect religious groups precisely because such groups play such a vital 
role in maintaining democratic government. 
This vision of the interaction between religious groups and the state is 
entirely consistent with the line of Supreme Court cases dealing with intra-
church property disputes, cited and relied upon in Hosanna-Tabor.
187
 In 
each case, the Court held that secular courts could not, consistent with the 
Establishment Clause, reconsider decisions made by the highest authority 
within a church regarding which church faction controlled particular 
property.
188
 This makes sense because, in those cases, the lower courts had 
reversed the decisions of ecclesiastical authorities on essentially religious 
grounds, thereby directly intruding on the religious group’s internal 
 
 
 182. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 183. I am writing this sentence on the 50th anniversary of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
“I have a Dream” speech, perhaps the quintessential illustration in modern American history of why 
religious groups can and must engage in politics and policy. 
 184. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256 (1979). 
 185. For a related argument, see Schwartzman, supra note 110, at 1391. 
 186. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (January 1, 1802), in 
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
 187. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School and Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704–
05 (2012) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the 
U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)). 
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religious or ideological autonomy. Such intervention would be 
problematic for any democratic association, not just a church.
189
 On the 
other hand, the Court has also held that when a court resolves an internal 
church property dispute based on “neutral principles of law” rather than 
“religious doctrine and practice,” no constitutional bar is raised.190  
The truth is that the problem faced by the Court in the property-dispute 
cases—the problem of how the law should deal with internal dissent 
within a group, especially a group with a complex structure—is a difficult, 
perhaps intractable issue, regardless of whether the group is religious or 
secular.
191
 The Court’s general solution appears to be to forbid direct 
intervention into internal group dynamics but to permit the application of 
neutral laws that incidentally affect those dynamics. The key insight, 
however, is that, contrary to what the Court said in Roberts,
192
 the 
application of antidiscrimination law is a direct regulation of group 
structure, not an incidental burden. It is not an incidental burden because 
the right to associate and assemble must include the right to organize a 
group as the members choose, including selecting members and choosing 
a leadership—and concomitantly, rejecting some individuals as members 
or leaders. As such, application of antidiscrimination laws burdens the 
association and assembly rights of all democratic associations, not just 
churches.
193
 
Religious groups are therefore appropriately protected by the Assembly 
Clause and appropriately engaged in the process of self-governance. 
Obviously though, religious groups are not the only groups that contribute 
to self-governance. Nor is it clear that religious groups contribute more 
directly than secular and semi-secular ideological groups such as the Sierra 
Club or the Boy Scouts. The thrust of this discussion is to show that the 
Assembly Clause protects the internal autonomy of both secular and 
religious groups that constitute democratic associations. In turn, this 
means that reliance on the Assembly Clause to protect religious groups 
obviates the need to define what constitutes a “religious group,” as is 
 
 
 189. This is not to say that the Establishment Clause does not mandate some distinctions between 
religious and secular groups, however. I examine this issue in Part IV, infra. 
 190. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). 
 191. The definitive scholarly discussion of this problem is Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001). 
 192. 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (describing the application of antidiscrimination law as causing 
“some incidental abridgement of the Jaycees’” rights). 
 193. This is not to say, of course, that the group will necessarily prevail in claiming an exception 
from nondiscrimination law; the strength of the state interest in combating discrimination must also be 
taken into account. 
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required to implement a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion 
Clauses. As noted earlier, such a task is impossible, and asking courts, 
which are after all governmental bodies, to define religion is in deep 
tension with Establishment Clause values.
194
 
Reliance on the Assembly Clause also mitigates the problem of 
determining what sorts of religious relationships are protected from 
regulation—i.e., of defining who is, and is not, a “minister”—the question 
on which the Hosanna-Tabor Court splintered. As we noted, any attempt 
by a secular court to define the term “minister” is likely doomed to clash 
with the Establishment Clause. The Assembly Clause, however, does not 
require any such religious determination. Instead, it would extend 
protection to a group’s right to select individuals who are relevant to the 
group’s democratic and ideological mission. There is no doubt that there 
must be some deference to a group’s determinations in this regard if the 
group’s autonomy is to be meaningful, as noted by the Court in Boy Scouts 
v. Dale,
195
 and by Justice Thomas in Hosanna-Tabor.
196
 But that deference 
is not infinite: the Assembly Clause does not protect either the Sierra 
Club’s or Hosanna-Tabor’s right to discriminate in hiring a janitor. On the 
other hand, Perich surely played a role in formulating and imparting the 
Hosanna-Tabor school’s ideological and religious commitments in her role 
as a teacher. Therefore, a school would clearly have a right to fire a 
teacher like Perich free of state interference, as long as the school claims, 
as Hosanna-Tabor did, that its dispute with the teacher was related to the 
school’s ideological commitments. Note that this result would follow 
regardless of the school’s religious affiliation, at least with respect to 
nonprofit schools, though most non-religious schools may have a harder 
time demonstrating that an employment dispute touches upon the school’s 
ideological mission. 
The implication of all of this is that the group-autonomy right 
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor is not properly described as a “ministerial” 
exception at all, because an exception based on the Assembly Clause 
should not be limited to ministers or churches. Instead, it is properly 
understood as a general associational exception covering all group 
members or employees who have a role in formulating or expounding the 
group’s values, or in otherwise advancing the group’s democratic 
participation.  
 
 
 194. See supra Part II.D.  
 195. 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). 
 196. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School and Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710–11 
(2012) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Melding the ministerial exception with the association/assembly right 
will require some adjustments to the latter. In particular, there is a tension 
between the formulation of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor 
and of the expressive association right in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 
regarding the level of judicial inquiry into regulations’ impact on a group. 
Hosanna-Tabor holds that such an inquiry is inappropriate because it 
undermines the principle that courts should play no role in appointing 
ministers.
197
 In Roberts, on the other hand, the Court engaged in a close 
inquiry into the impact of regulation on the Jaycees’ expression in the 
course of rejecting their First Amendment claim.
198
 The Hosanna-Tabor 
Court probably went too far in eschewing any examination of a church’s 
asserted reasons for acting as it did. After all, if an action literally has no 
relationship to a church’s religious functions, application of neutral law to 
such an action seems unproblematic, as illustrated by cases such as Jones 
v. Wolf permitting application of “neutral principles of law” to internal 
church disputes.
199
 
But Roberts goes far too far in the opposite direction. The kind of 
searching, distrustful examination of the inner workings and beliefs of an 
organization that the Roberts Court undertook is extraordinarily dismissive 
of a group’s autonomy and leaves the group’s rights at the whim of a 
possibly hostile judiciary. Some deference toward a group’s views 
regarding the impact of regulation on its ability to function seems essential 
if autonomy is to be meaningful, as the Court seemed to recognize in Boy 
Scouts v. Dale.
200
 Dale was correctly decided for the same reasons that 
Hosanna-Tabor was correctly decided: in both cases, the group at issue 
was able to assert a good-faith belief that its ideological coherence was 
harmed by the continued inclusion of an individual. The problem was not, 
as the Dale Court held, that inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster 
in the Boy Scouts would “impair its expression.”201 The problem was that 
this inclusion directly infringed on the Boy Scouts’ independent right to 
organize itself and select its members in a way that shaped the group’s 
values and ideological commitments. 
There is no question that recognition of such a broad exception from 
antidiscrimination laws and perhaps other employment regulations will 
burden society’s legitimate efforts to combat discrimination and other 
 
 
 197. Id. at 709 (declining to engage in a pretext analysis for this reason). 
 198. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626–29. 
 199. 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). 
 200. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653. 
 201. Id. 
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forms of socially destructive behavior. The burden, however, should not 
be too great. It seems likely that most, if not quite all, commercial entities, 
including almost all for-profit corporations, should be categorically denied 
Assembly Clause protections, on the grounds that their purposes and 
structures make their relevance to self-governance tangential at best.
202
 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that many groups will be willing to 
publicly take the position that they are ideologically driven to 
discriminate, a tendency that has no doubt been reinforced by the dramatic 
consequences to the Boy Scouts of its decision to do so. In addition, in 
some cases the government will undoubtedly be able to demonstrate a 
sufficiently strong interest to overcome a group’s Assembly Clause rights, 
especially if exclusion from the group has substantial collateral 
consequences. However, it cannot be denied that some antisocial behavior 
will undoubtedly become immunized from state regulation. That is the 
price of a robust First Amendment in a pluralistic, self-governing society. 
IV. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REDUX 
Until now, I have argued for an essential equivalence between religious 
and secular group rights, all deriving from the Assembly Clause of the 
First Amendment. Reliance on the Religion Clauses is historically and 
textually unjustified and forces the courts unnecessarily to confront 
unresolvable boundary problems.
203
 This seems to suggest that the 
Religion Clauses are essentially irrelevant to the autonomy rights of 
religious groups, except insofar as such groups can claim Free Exercise 
Clause rights derivative of their members. The Establishment Clause 
seems out of the picture altogether. But that cannot be quite right. By 
forbidding government endorsement
204
 and coercion
205
 of religion, the 
Establishment Clause has some impact on the government’s relationship 
with religious groups. In particular, the Establishment Clause has long 
been understood to forbid direct government payments to support 
religion.
206
 It was a dispute over precisely such actions that elicited 
Madison’s famous Memorial and Remonstrance.207 There is, however, no 
similar prohibition of government funding of speech or secular groups, 
 
 
 202. See Bhagwat, supra note 28, at 1002, for a more extended discussion of this point. 
 203. See supra Part III. 
 204. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 205. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 206. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). 
 207. Id. at 11–12. 
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even on a selective, content-based basis.
208
 Does this undermine the 
position advanced in Part III, that secular and religious groups are 
indistinguishable for group-autonomy purposes? 
I would argue that it does not. First, the difference between secular and 
religious groups should not be overstated. Under current law, religious 
groups remain free to receive state funds, so long as the funds are part of a 
neutral program advancing a secular legislative purpose.
209
 In addition, the 
government’s supposed right to fund speech selectively must have limits. 
Whatever the doctrine says, it is inconceivable that any court would 
uphold a government program of financing political candidates that funded 
only Democratic candidates or only funded candidates who publicly 
supported a particular policy. It would seem obvious therefore that some 
form of the anti-preferentialism rule must carry over into the secular 
sphere. But it also must be acknowledged that differences remain: some 
content-based preferences for secular speech and groups are permitted, but 
official preferentialism between religions is strictly forbidden.
210
 
These differences do not undermine the basic argument advanced here: 
religious groups’ autonomy is best protected through the Assembly Clause 
on the same terms as secular groups. Moreover, the reason for protecting 
the autonomy of all groups is the instrumental one of advancing 
democratic self-government rather than advancing the dignitary goals of 
the Religion Clauses. To reiterate, the fact that the state may not act to 
advance religion does not mean that religious groups must be excluded 
from politics, any more than the Equal Protection Clause demands 
exclusion of the KKK.
211
 Indeed, the separation between religious groups 
and the state may actually make religious groups more effective 
contributors to democratic self-governance than secular groups.
212
 In other 
words, the distinctive treatment of religious groups under the 
Establishment Clause can be understood to argue for, not against, 
protecting such groups under the Assembly Clause. 
There is another potential difference between religious and secular 
groups rooted in the Establishment Clause regarding the nature of the 
 
 
 208. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). This difference in funding power is an aspect of 
the broader distinction between religious and secular topics, that the government remains free to adopt 
its own positions on secular matters, but may not take sides in religious debates. See Brownstein, supra 
note 180, at 1711 & n.33 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 590–92). 
 209. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 210. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. 
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994). 
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protection such groups receive. To understand this possible difference, 
some background is needed. Under the Court’s current jurisprudence, the 
autonomy of secular groups is protected, to the extent it is, under the 
derivative right of “expressive association,” while religious groups also 
receive protection under the Religion Clauses. In the foundational 
expressive-association case, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
213
 the Court held that 
in order to establish an expressive-association claim, a group must 
demonstrate that it communicates a coherent message and that inclusion of 
an unwanted member will interfere with the group’s ability to express that 
message. Furthermore, in the course of rejecting the Jaycees’ association 
claim, the Court engaged in a careful examination of the group’s message 
and the impact of regulation on the group’s ability to convey that 
message.
214
 Such an intrusive inquiry is inappropriate with respect to all 
democratic associations, because it is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
notion that such groups must be autonomous of the state, which of course 
includes the courts.  
The Court’s most important expressive-association case since Roberts 
tends to support this view. In Boy Scouts v. Dale, the Court reiterated the 
Roberts Court’s position that an expressive-association claim depends on 
proof that a group “engage[s] in some form of expression,” and that “the 
presence of [the person the group seeks to exclude] affects in a significant 
way the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.”215 The 
Court proceeded to defer to the Boy Scouts on the crucial questions of 
whether the Scouts were sincerely opposed to homosexuality and whether 
the presence of a gay assistant scoutmaster would burden the Scout’s 
expression.
216
 The Dale Court was quite correct to defer to the Boy 
Scouts’ assertion that they were opposed to homosexuality. Furthermore, 
given the broad reading of the Assembly Clause set forth above, the 
Court’s separate inquiry in both Roberts and Dale into whether inclusion 
of a particular member will interfere with a group’s speech is entirely 
unnecessary since, under a proper reading of the Assembly Clause, groups 
enjoy an independent right of autonomy not simply one derivative of their 
speech rights. Under this approach, the associational rights of secular 
groups become equivalent to the broad ministerial exception for religious 
groups recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, because the Hosanna-Tabor 
Court’s injunction that courts may not inquire into a religious group’s 
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actual motivations for terminating a minister should also be followed for 
secular groups.
217
  
It must be conceded, however, that the parallel here is not perfect. The 
Assembly Clause is best understood to protect not all employment 
relationships but only those relevant to the group’s democratic and 
ideological mission. In adjudicating the autonomy rights of secular groups, 
some inquiry into whether the exclusion impacts that mission is inevitable, 
though, as in Dale, some deference is undoubtedly due to the group. With 
regard to religious groups, that deference may well need to be stronger. 
State inquiries into the ideological commitments of all groups are 
unseemly and undermine their autonomy; but inquiries into religious 
commitments also run head-long into the Establishment Clause, making 
them especially problematic. It should be emphasized, however, that this 
distinction is not as great as it seems. Some deference is due to all groups, 
and even the Hosanna-Tabor Court did not purport to immunize all 
employment decisions of religious groups. The bottom line remains that 
the Assembly Clause, properly understood, provides ample protection for 
the autonomy of both religious and secular groups, the best justification 
for such protection, and essentially identical protections for both types of 
groups. 
CONCLUSION 
The Assembly Clause of the First Amendment provides broad 
protection for the autonomy of groups, both religious and secular, that 
contribute to the process of democratic self-governance. Concomitantly, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor to root religious groups’ 
autonomy rights in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is 
supported by neither text, nor history, nor principle. The equality of 
religious and secular groups that I assert here is, however, controversial. 
Religion does seem different from more secular ideological commitments, 
both in its significance to individuals and in its underlying framework of 
justification. For that reason it may well be that, the Supreme Court’s 
Smith decision notwithstanding,
218
 the Religion Clauses are properly read 
to provide broad exemptions for religiously motivated conduct even 
though conduct motivated by secular ideologies would not enjoy parallel 
exemptions. But these arguments only relate to the protection of 
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individuals, not groups. There is no reason, and no justification, for 
fundamentally distinguishing religious groups from similar secular groups 
that play a parallel role in our system of popular sovereignty. Both types 
of groups are democratic associations, worthy of strong protections. 
The defense of religious group autonomy on instrumental grounds 
should not, however, be taken too far. Even if the reason why the 
Constitution, through the Assembly Clause, protects the autonomy of 
religious groups is because of such groups’ contributions to self-
governance, religious institutions themselves often will not see this as their 
primary role. Furthermore, citizens obviously do not generally join and 
attend churches for such instrumental reasons. Finally, certain kinds of 
regulations of religious institutions undoubtedly will violate the Free 
Exercise Clause because they will violate the rights of the individuals who 
belong to such institutions. Simply put, however, a religious group’s right 
to institutional autonomy is best located in the Assembly Clause rather 
than in the Religion Clauses. 
A final word of caution is in order. It seems unlikely that our complex, 
heterogeneous society will ever come to a final consensus on the difficult 
questions surrounding the exercise of state authority over religious groups 
and the engagement of religious groups in democratic politics. Hard cases 
will remain and disagreements will never be fully settled. The 
contentiousness of these issues with regards to religious groups is 
undoubtedly greater than with secular groups, at least in part because of 
the unparalleled significance that religious convictions play in the lives of 
many Americans. Even the very idea of secular-religious equivalence 
advanced here and elsewhere
219
 is no doubt offensive to some. However, 
the arguments advanced here do not question, or support, the primacy of 
individual religious autonomy over other forms of individual autonomy. 
They only question the preferences for religious over secular groups 
expressed in the Hosanna-Tabor decision. As for line drawing, that too is 
unavoidable and difficult. What an approach to group autonomy rooted in 
the Assembly Clause does avoid though, in contrast to the Religion 
Clauses-based approach, is drawing lines on the basis of religious doctrine 
and dogma. And that is no small benefit. 
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